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Abstract 
The year 2011 may go down in history as the year of the indignation; this word sums up a movement 
that has become a widespread disaffection with politics in a new kind of protest. Is this a new version 
of the popular revolutionary practice? How is the relationship between the institutions and the street in 
a disintermediated world? Is the political mistrust an advertisement of the next crisis of democracy or 
another stage of their settlement? In any case, the very idea of representation is challenged from a 
claim that can lead to populism in so far as it does not seem to understand the limitations of 
democratic self-determination and the nature of our political condition. 
Keywords 
Indignation, representation, direct democracy, disintermediation 
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“There is failure when there is action.” 
Jean Paul Sartre. Notebooks for an Ethics. 435.  
Introduction* 
Politics has been held in great esteem and subjected to utter scorn. We have judged it a task to be 
carried out by a small minority, then by everyone, and finally by no one. It has been considered the 
solution, and now it seems to be the problem. Esteemed at certain moments in history as the most 
noble pursuit, even overvalued as if it were a means to salvation, feared as a consolidation of power, 
and accepted at times as a profession that at least strives for respectability, it is currently tolerated as 
irrelevant or even openly disparaged as the cause of our worst ills.  
Politics probably never deserved to be held in such high regard, and it may be that the disdain to 
which it is currently subjected reveals society’s lack of sincerity with itself. In any case, there is no 
question that there is room for improvement in politics as it is currently practiced. The aversion 
towards politics today is compatible with the fact that more is now demanded of it than we ever 
previously expected of it. This is revealed both in the way citizens scrutinize power structures and by 
contemporary protest movements. Groups such as the Spanish Indignados (“Indignant Ones”) 
contradict those who used to believe that political distrust toward politics was a sign of indifference.  
This situation raises any number of questions about the role politics can play in the world today and 
about the quality of our democracies. In the first place, it is important not to misinterpret the meaning 
of our dissatisfaction. Should we view the current protests as revolutionary, or are they actually less 
significant insurrections? How are conflict and protest expressed in contemporary society? Does a lack 
of trust strengthen or undermine democracy? Is mediation unnecessary and representation impossible 
now that public spaces have been transformed by globalization and the new technologies of 
communication? In short, is this a time of crisis or exhaustion or could it be an opportunity to 
transform our democracies? 
1. From Revolution to Indignation 
When a system makes revolution unattainable or unnecessary, that system is completely stabilized. 
This does not mean protest is made impossible; just the opposite, in fact. Only senseless regimes fail 
to understand that protests afford them stability. What happens is that protests stop being 
revolutionary and become expressive. That is why it makes no sense to criticize the current Indignados 
in Spain or similar movements elsewhere for not having a concrete plan of action or for not offering 
specific alternatives. Their role is to express dissatisfaction, to call attention to something, not to 
compete with the political parties’ electoral platforms. In the imperfect democracies that currently 
exist, the proliferation of protest movements is not a sign of democratic weakness. Instead, it signals 
an increase in the level of demands that the people are making of those who govern them.  
We can see this in the competition the Indignados have unleashed for the most ingenious slogan. 
This supplants a debate that would have previously focused on determining the most appropriate 
action for sabotaging or subverting. It is essential to understand this fact in order to respond 
appropriately. An expressive protest does not necessitate the intervention of the authorities to restore 
public order, but it does require thought in order to properly interpret what the movement signifies or 
reveals. Conflict has become a mode of expression; its purpose is to communicate and comprehend. 
We have not entered a new phase of the great revolutions that characterized the transformation of 
                                                     
* Translation by Sandra Kingery. 
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democratic societies; rather, we are facing a phenomenon linked to the spectacularization of our public 
life.  
The term “post-democratic” was recently coined to denote a state of stability in contemporary 
democracies. For the most optimistic among us, this implied a celebration of the definitive 
establishment of democracy; for the pessimists, it suggested a period characterized by mediocrity and 
decline. The two perspectives, rather than being contradictory, may simply be different ways of 
looking at the same reality that, while strengthened, is also trivialized. Analyses by Crouch, Rancière, 
Zolo, and Guéhenno have traced every detail of this debate. At the most fundamental level, are we 
faced with a situation where change is no longer possible? Or could it be that change can only be made 
from within the system we mean to transform? 
In order to resolve this enigma, we must understand how dissatisfaction is handled in contemporary 
society. We must take note of some events that could be called “post-revolutionary” insofar as they are 
expressive insurrections rather than destabilizing revolutions. A Spanish Indignado is not a 
revolutionary, just as stirring something up does not necessarily imply an ability to transform. There 
are no revolutions for the same reasons there is no true political antagonism: there are differences and 
changes, of course, but political time has stopped being regulated by uprisings. Political confrontation 
is not a collision between competing models. There is no revolutionary contrast to be found in the 
rivalry between parties, where time is flat and the competing roles are played by a government that 
resists change and an opposition that awaits it (the best reason for a change of government is to clean 
house, not to reap the benefits of the opposition’s alternative plan). Everyone who is not a part of the 
government represents “change,” which is not a value of the left or the right but of opposition.  
The language of change, along with everything it presupposes about historic time and political 
intervention, is faulty. In progressive discourse, revolution has been substituted by modernization, 
adaptation, and innovation; the idea of reform generally belongs to the right; and on the extreme left, 
there are critical gestures, but no critical theory of society (much less a plan of action). A good deal of 
what is said and done is nothing but a simple display of melancholy or of “heroism against the market” 
(Grunberg and Laïdi 2007, 9).  
There is no revolutionary distinction outside of the political system either, in the external forces 
that the protest or Indignado movements may represent. The current ideological disillusionment is 
revealed in the fact that neither the extreme left nor the extreme right is particularly interested in 
intervening through the normal means of representation. Both conservative individualism and radical 
leftism conceive of themselves as “parapolitical” or as “anti-establishment movements.” In the 
ideology of both, pirates take on the status of role models in the fight against the rigidity of the state or 
against the neoliberal order. For different and even conflicting reasons, piracy is considered the most 
appropriate response to the economic and cultural development of capitalism.  
Some call for a civil society and others, on the post-communist left, for the multitude (Hardt and 
Negri 2000). Both concepts are very liquid and not very political. This is no longer the age of the right 
and left as institutions, but the age of the Tea Party and social movements. The right prefers the market 
to the state, and the left—rather than the traditional struggles (labor union, social, institutional, or 
armed)—substitutes other fighting responses such as exile, defection, or nomadization. As Deleuze 
and Guattari have suggested, the nomad, more than the proletarian, signifies resistance par excellence 
(1987). On the left, the most innovative strategies reflect the decline of revolutionary ideals. The most 
we can hope for is “détournement,” the satiric parody that is posed by contemporary art, making use of 
a term coined by the Situationists; it is quite simply an attempt at sabotage, derailment, distortion, or 
subversion. According to Deleuze, it implies interruptions or mini-insurrections; nothing, of course, 
that recalls the ancient goal of seizing power. The most ambitious proposal is to benefit from gaps or 
from areas not controlled by the state. Naomi Klein (2000), one of the principal advocates of the anti-
globalization movement, calls for “culture jamming” as a form of resistance. This is an interference 
that attempts to transform brand advertising without altering its communication codes in order to spark 
Politics after Indignation: Possibilities and Limits of Direct Democracy 
3 
a reevaluation of the values those brands transmit. It is easy to note the contradiction of this 
alterglobalization since employing piracy clearly reveals a failure to believe that “another world is 
possible.”  
Whenever we see these attempted aggravations, there are those who interpret them as a revelation 
of some type of truly political action, in contrast with a political system or class, both considered 
depersonalized realities. Following the lead of Guy Debord and Giorgio Agamben, Zizek recently 
documented this expectation in his book Living in the End of Times (2010). It is an evocation of an 
entirely different world order that fails to give us the slightest indication of what it might involve, what 
social agent could provoke a change of such magnitude, and the most appropriate course of action. 
This pop-Leninism corresponds to the hope that the change toward a new world order will arise from 
the self-destructive processes of the existing order. This millenarianism does not include a single 
factual, critical description of contemporary society. When we wield almost nothing of diagnostic 
value, it is clear that we cannot do anything, beyond awaiting the apocalypse.  
All of this is symptomatic of a time when we have stripped politics of its active nature that could 
have produced a change toward something better. And it takes place within a context where cultural, 
social, and technological changes are unstoppable constants, but we have lost hope in change of a 
political nature. Of all the social fields, politics gives the greatest impression of paralysis; it has 
stopped being an agent of shaping change and become a place where deadlock is administered. This 
situation is judged differently by liberals who lament the slow pace of reform and leftists who 
complain about the lack of alternatives.  
Indignation, generic commitment, utopian alterglobalization, or expressive insurrectionism should 
not be understood, in my opinion, as the harbinger of radical change but as the symptom that none of 
this is feasible outside of the realm of unexceptional democratic normality and modest reformism. The 
problem with large critical gestures is not that something different is proposed, but that things tend to 
remain unchanged when the desired modifications are outside of the logic of politics.  
2. A Democratic Tension 
Charles Taylor has stated that democracy is a tension between institutions and the public. In addition 
to the type of politics we could call “official,” there is a whole sublayer of processes that condition 
institutional realities. Among other benefits, the tensions that result from this coexistence help ensure 
that the political system is enriched, corrected, or more forward-looking. We cannot depend solely on 
the skill sets of professional politicians to achieve political progress. A good deal of the progress that 
has already been accomplished by politics was triggered by external forces: it is probably true that 
most social advances were not dreamed up by politicians; these results were achieved because of very 
concrete social pressures. The political system requires a certain degree of social energy as well as 
resources it does not independently possess to perform its tasks. These requirements sometimes 
inconvenience or even subvert the established order but inevitably influence its exercise of power. 
That being said, the assumption that “the public” is necessarily better than institutions is a large 
one; the public also includes regressive movements, pressures and lobbies, irrational emotions, 
illegitimate or insufficient representation. “The public” can be worse than institutions, and may even 
be reactionary. We should not forget that the world of social movements is as plural as society itself 
and that social initiatives can be expected to provide one thing and its opposite, advances and retreats, 
right-leaning and left-leaning movements. Many who invoke society’s participation are thinking only 
of that which suit their needs, but society, naturally enough, affords participants with a wide range of 
perspectives. There are those on both sides of the political spectrum who hope to step outside of the 
framework of representative democracy: the meaning that the social movements of the 1960s hold in 
left-wing imagery is matched by the neoliberals’ demands for civil society in the 1990s. This 
concurrence should at least give us pause. 
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Democracy is a regime that accepts not only that tension, but other tensions as well, because we 
assume that no person or group is always right. What saves us from the damages produced by bad 
decisions is that they are balanced out by other agents, limitations, and procedures: there is 
government, but fortunately there is also opposition; opinion polls help us know what people want at 
present, but the political leadership can also focus on less popular criteria. There are things about 
which one should consult and others about which consultation is forbidden; the administration protects 
us from politicians who are too original, while the daring decisions made by those very politicians 
compensate the bureaucracy’s lack of imagination. Experts limit the frivolity of certain politicians, and 
those same politicians help us escape the tyranny of the experts. Without the rules of the game, we 
would be in no position to discuss different goals, but it is not uncommon for the discussion to lead to 
a demand for a revision of some of those same rules. The dualism between institutions and the public 
is one of those balances that should be taken into account, like the balance between representation and 
participation or between obedience and protest.  
But what if the greatest threat to our democracies was not so much the strength of institutions as 
their weakness in the face of the capriciousness of public opinion? What does political regulation of 
the marketplace mean except obstructing the inevitable chain of events stemming from investors’ free 
decisions? The problem we face is the populism that, with its lack of balance and responsibility, 
impedes the creation of the public good. Our democracies’ fragility stems not from the distance 
between the elites and the people but from what we could call their excessive closeness, the instability 
of a politics that is vulnerable to existing pressures at any given point in time, paying attention only to 
temporary changes of opinion (Bardhan 1999, 95-96; Calhoun 1988).  
In a democratic society, politics is at the service of the will of the people, of course, but that will is 
just as complex, as in need of interpretation as is the reality of “the people” to which we are constantly 
making reference. Like everything that is considered self-evident, bringing up “the people” almost 
always serves to block discussion. But as soon as we go a little deeper, the disagreements begin. Are 
“the people” the ones reflected in polls and surveys, the ones the representatives represent, a reality 
pervaded by globalization, or an autarkic unit safe from all interference? They are probably all those 
things; democratic procedures are nothing but ways of verifying whom or what we are talking about in 
every case. “The people,” from the outset, is a fuzzy reality, something that needs to be elaborated; 
that is the purpose of representation, public discussion, and the institutional procedures that define 
boundaries or modify and transform them into democratic decisions.  
Institutions protect us against the demagogic appeal to “the people.” They represent them and pull 
together their constituent plurality and the complexity of their demands. Because of political 
representation, the people’s will is operative and integrative of the times that constitute it. This is 
important to remember, especially when commonplaces suggest the opposite and when there is such 
fascination with popular “spontaneity” that we are made to assume that those who protest are always 
in the right and those who promote participation necessarily strengthen democracy.  
3. The Utopia of Disintermediation 
The current fascination with social networks, participation, and proximity reveals that the only utopia 
that continues to be in force is that of disintermediation. A lack of confidence in mediation leads us to 
automatically presume that things are true when they are transparent, that representation always 
falsifies, and that every secret is illegitimate. There is nothing worse than an intermediary. That is why 
we immediately feel closer to someone who leaks information than to a journalist, to an amateur than a 
professional, to NGOs than to governments. For this reason, our greatest scorn is aimed at those who 
imply the greatest degree of mediation: as the opinion polls remind us, our problem is . . . the political 
class.  
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What has led to this way of thinking? First off, technology is having a profound impact on 
relationships between people, the configuration of public spaces, and our relationship with the 
institutions of authority. The new information and communication technologies led to the beginning of 
the current democratizing wave by allowing for a disintermediation that previous technologies did not 
support.  
These new information and communication technologies allow us to live in a type of “consecration 
of the amateur,” a society of non-professionals, that has produced a true democratization of skills 
(Flichy 2010). The new image of a citizen is that of an amateur who informs him- or herself, expresses 
opinions freely, and develops new forms of commitment without needing authorization or instruction. 
These new skills make citizens as suspicious of experts as of their representatives. Experts no longer 
state irrefutable facts or use their knowledge to put an end to all controversy. In a knowledge-based 
society, people possess greater cognitive abilities. New organizations and interest groups arise that 
help weaken the authority of the experts. The knowledge that was once possessed esoteric is now 
publically debated, controlled, and regulated.  
Collective intelligence challenges the experts since it has, right from the start, enabled anyone to 
make use of any available knowledge. In a knowledge-based society, there is an upsurge in the 
average amount of knowledge, the free circulation of facts, the ability to communicate one’s opinions. 
For this reason, the new transmission of knowledge and expertise has great democratizing potential. 
Democracy arose in specific opposition to the monopoly of power and in favor of a universalization of 
the ability to govern. This new democratization now rests on the fact that technological capabilities 
allow anyone to acquire skills in vigilance, control, and judgment at any time.  
That being said, the elimination of mediation is an ambiguous reality: the desire to ban it is fueled 
by democratic dreams of free spontaneity, more transparent markets, and the unlimited accessibility of 
information. It is the dream that opinion polls can make political wishes perfectly apparent, making it 
possible to govern based solely on polling numbers. But a ban on mediation could also produce the 
nightmare of a public space lacking the balance provided by limits, procedures, or representation. All 
this factors protect democracy from its possible irrationality because limits also guarantee our rights, 
procedures challenge arbitrary responses, and representation offsets populism. Of course, transparency 
and proximity are political values, but one might also value democratic discretion or democratic 
impartiality. This reveals a fact of which classic writers were already well aware: in politics, any value 
without a counterweight becomes a potential threat.  
It is not coincidental that this dynamic of disintermediation is made manifest in diverse social 
environments and with different effects: if it has been used to justify deregulation in the economy, in 
politics it has promoted forms of direct and participatory democracy. Disintermediation was originally 
connected to economic neoliberalism; it has now spread to other domains. The affinity found between 
neoliberalism and the radical left is always a surprise. 
In essence, the same logic and reasoning used in favor of representation also supports the 
regulation of the marketplace: there is no self-regulating, transparent market nor is there a group of 
people that is clearly capable of self-determination. In order to be effective and to be accepted as 
legitimate, both the market and the people require procedures, rules, and representation. So what if our 
great challenge were precisely to construct mediations that, while less rigid, were still mediations? 
These new mediations, applied to the economy, politics, or the culture, would make the greatest 
possible amount of freedom compatible with a structure that protects rights and eliminates undesirable 
side-effects. 
In this respect, it is not very useful to envision a real-time politics that suppresses institutional 
mediation, rhetorical circumlocutions, and the protocols of agreement. An ideology of immediacy 
proposes returning to the people the power that is unjustly retained by their representatives. It is 
presumed that democratic representation must be a falsification, or at least a deformation, of the pure 
will of the people, the fragmentation of their original unity into the atomism of various interests.  
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Being sceptical of the blessings enjoyed by direct democracy does not mean that we are joining 
forces with those who fight against the “masses” and their unfortunate reactions. In reality, there is no 
such thing as “the people” as a metaphysical unit or as the authentic and incorruptible essence of the 
nation. Neither are they, as twenty-first century cultural criticism has disdainfully portrayed them, 
amorphous “plebs” or a totality of the “consumer hordes.” Representative institutions are not an 
abstraction of the people’s concrete wishes, but rather the opposite: institutionalized democracy is 
what transforms the abstraction of the “people” into a visible form that is concrete and operative. Its 
wishes can be verified.  
Striving for a more truthful political system only leads to a strengthening of the illusion that we live 
in a world that is retransmitted live, entirely subservient to the present moment. The invocation of a 
politics that reproduces true social reality brings to bear all the functions of a mythical reality that can 
always be called upon to justify anything. The demand that people act in the immediacy of the 
moment ends up delegitimizing as inauthentic the delicate artifices that societies devise in order to be 
able to work together.  
That is why the creation of the general will sometimes fails (we are currently seeing this in the 
stuttering evolution of the Arab revolts or in the Occupy movements of the Western world). Creating 
the general will is as decisive for democratization as indignation and protest are. Popular mobilization 
is needed to call attention to an intolerable state of affairs, but in order to delve more deeply into 
democracy, we need both representation and compromise in order to situate ourselves within a 
political framework.  
4. Ballot Boxes and Dreams 
One of the slogans most frequently shouted by the Spanish Indignados was: “Our dreams don’t fit into 
your ballot boxes.” As with all utopian demands, this takes its cue from the comfortable prestige of the 
impossible, which saves us from asking whether our dreams are, at times, nightmares for other people. 
I am not going to focus my attention here on the fact that the electoral slate from which we have to 
choose clearly admits improvement. Instead, I will attempt to emphasize a reality that defines our 
political condition: no one, especially in politics, gets what he or she wants. This is, incidentally, one 
of democracy’s great achievements.  
A society is democratically mature when it assimilates the fact that politics is inevitably 
disappointing and continues to make political demands. Politics is inseparable from a willingness to 
compromise, which is the ability to accept that something is good even when it does not completely 
satisfy one’s particular goals. A person who does not have the ability to live with these types of 
frustrations and respect his or her limits is unsuited for politics. We have been taught that this is what 
makes politics irresponsible and fraudulent, but we should get used to seeing that this is what defines 
it.  
In a democratic society, politics cannot be a means for achieving goals designed at a distance from 
real circumstances, beyond institutional realities, or without keeping other people in mind, including 
those who do not share the same goals. Any political dream is only achievable in collaboration with 
other people who also want to participate in its definition. Pacts and alliances reveal that we need other 
people and that power is always a shared reality. Democratic coexistence affords many possibilities 
but also imposes a good number of limitations. In the first place, there are limits that stem from 
recognizing that other groups or interested parties have as much of a right as you have to try to win.  
That is why political action always implies making concessions. Those who confront any 
individual problem as a question of principle, those who speak constantly of doctrines or of things that 
cannot be conceded or of conflict, these are people who doom themselves to frustration or 
authoritarianism. Politics fails when rival groups advocate positions that they consider completely 
incompatible and contradictory or when they refuse to admit any concessions. All zealots believe that 
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their opponents are beyond political persuasion. Those who are unable to understand the plausibility of 
the other side’s arguments will never be able to think, much less act, politically.  
One of the symptoms of the poor quality of our public space is the growing influence of groups and 
people who have not understood this reality and who practice an insistent depolitization. The fragility 
of our democracies in the face of populist pressure is revealed through phenomena such as the Tea 
Party, a true stronghold of inflexibility. I am not merely referring to the movement in the United 
States, but to a much more widespread tendency in our democracies. We could say without 
exaggeration that we all have our own Tea Party now. Political parties, churches, labor unions, and the 
media are overwhelmed by a series of movements that are generated around them and that try to 
influence their habitual practices or directly question their representativeness.  
Each of these groups endures its own particular siege against the moderates, a friendly fire that 
creates a solid impasse so no compromise will be brokered and no ground ceded to the enemy. In this 
sense, Tea Parties are strongly ideological yet disorganized power structures that live like parasites off 
a different ideological power structure, this one official but weakened. They demand that the official 
groups guarantee absolute loyalty to a number of political objectives that must be achieved without 
compensation to or compromise with the enemy. In this way, the idea of consensus or the value of 
making deals is discredited. Those who belong to the Tea Party are guardians of principle who, rather 
than fight their enemies, lie in wait for those who resemble them the most. They fulfill the adage that 
the worst enemy is always within our own ranks. We can reflect, then, on the political significance of 
labels such as “without hang-ups” or the proliferation of displays of “pride” that are currently used to 
describe many ideological renovations.  
Among the most depoliticizing characteristics of these movements is their lack of a sense of 
responsibility, their unwillingness to come to an agreement, and their inability to engage in intelligent 
self-limitation. They defend an ideological nucleus (the family, the nation, the welfare state, the 
market, values) that they view as continually under assault, and their strongest suspicions are directed 
at the moderates within their own ranks. They are especially vulnerable to populism, and they carry a 
good deal of emotional weight. “Single issue movements” (on either extreme of the ideological 
spectrum and focused on various matters: the environment, women, the nation, abortion, etc.) are 
particularly given to bringing these extreme ideological influences to bear. These movements, since 
they are very concerned about a single issue and care almost nothing about anything else, tend to focus 
on whichever particular issue they consider essential without considering its viability, the urgency of 
its timeline, or a framework of compossibility.  
The combination of institutional weakness and a number of social and technological factors has 
distabilized the space for demand and protest, which is as deregulated as the markets. The social 
networks, which have unleashed great waves of mobilization, communication, and instantaneousness, 
have played a decisive role in all of this, but they tend to offer a destructured world in which everyone 
links to whomever else they choose. Because of this, these networks are less and less social since 
confrontation with someone who is different tends to be substituted by indignation alongside those 
who are similar, an emotion that is nurtured by communicating with other people who share the same 
irritations.  
This probably indicates that we need to reconsider politics in societies that are largely 
deinstitutionalized, whose conflicts do not have the structural function of previous social conflicts and 
where citizen demands do not find a clear outlet through labor unions or political representation. 
Because the world is now defined by anti-politics, not by democratic equilibrium. What we have are 
alternative authorities that intend not to balance the official power structures, but to neutralize them.  
Politics has always disciplined our dreams; it used to define them within a political reality and 
translate them into programs of action. For that reason, when politics is weak, our expectations 
regarding the collective future explode, and we become more vulnerable to irrationality. What do we 
then do with everything we hope to achieve through politics? Should we concede that, considering the 
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disappointing nature of social coexistence, there is no sense in formulating ideals or fighting for them? 
Instead, it is a question of making a distinction without which there can be no democratic coexistence. 
What does fit into ballot boxes are our aspirations; what comes after that—if we do not want to turn 
our own dreams into someone else’s nightmares—is the democratic interplay that often limits and 
frustrates our desires, but that also enriches them with other people’s contributions. If a person were 
able to realize all of his or her aspirations, he or she would not share our human or, especially, our 
political condition.  
5. A Democratic Suspicion 
It is a paradox that at the time when democracy has reached its greatest geographic extension, when it 
is most valued by the citizenry and there is no alternative model, we observe persistent symptoms of 
weakness and dysfunction. Polls reveal a growing disillusionment that some people interpret—
mistakenly, in my option—as absolute disinterest, but this should be analyzed more precisely. We are 
not facing the death of politics, but we are in the midst of a transformation that forces us to conceive 
of it and practice it in a different way.  
We should not allocate suspicion to outdated categories or relate current disappointments to the 
antiparliamentarism that dramatically weakened democratic governments at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. We are not on the verge of a democratic crisis, but entering a new era of democratic 
stability. The disappointment people feel is in no way subversive; it is perfectly compatible with a 
respect for the democratic order. It is a mistake to think this feeling is anything other than fully 
democratic. We should also not forget that a lack of trust (toward absolute power) is central to the very 
foundation of our political institutions. Democracy has always been construed as a system of limited 
and revocable trust; it is a regime that institutionalizes suspicion. Is it not true that what we generally 
bemoan as depoliticization simply does not correspond to the type of political leadership to which we 
were previously accustomed, that is, an emphatic, hierarchical style of leadership that tends not to be 
ultrademocratic? 
The current state of suspicion stems from the logical transformation of a society that is no longer 
heroic and whose political system has been stripped of its previous theatrical quality. A lack of trust is 
not the same as indifference; it is a “weak” disappointment that produces more distance than 
destruction (Lipovetsky 2006, 62). It is one thing for democracy not to foster too much enthusiasm and 
another for this disappointment to mean indifference to our form of political life. Even if we dislike 
our newspapers or political parties, for example, that does not mean we would let them be suppressed. 
The demystification of politics does not mean that we do not care about anything; it simply means that 
our fondness for our political system is not awash in passion or enthusiasm. It is not true that people 
have lost all interest in politics; we live in a society in which we feel a greater sense of political 
competence. We are now better educated and feel capable of passing judgment on public affairs, thus 
we are less tolerant of having that ability appropriated. Numerous studies show that the more 
education we have, the less confidence we feel in institutions or leaders (Dogan 2005, 14).  
One of the ways in which society expresses an opinion about politics is precisely through the 
intensity of its participation or interest. If we respect political pluralism in all its manifestations, why 
not accept that there is also plurality regarding degrees of participation and public commitment? Why 
should everyone have to be equally involved in political issues? And who determines the desired level 
of commitment? When citizens express a greater or lesser interest in politics, this is a sign that requires 
political interpretation. A lack of interest is a respectable way of stating an opinion or making a 
decision and not necessarily a dearth of political commitment. 
It is important not to err on this point if we want to understand the society in which we live. We are 
not facing a time of depoliticization, but a time of the demystification of politics. A society that is 
interdependent and heterarchical tends to detotalize politics. What some people hastily interpret as a 
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lack of interest stems from the fact that we live in a society where the public space cannot absorb all 
the dimensions of subjectivity. Although it may be true that politics now only mobilizes passions in a 
superficial fashion, that does not mean that our demands on politics have disappeared. Just the 
opposite. The same people who are absolutely uninterested in politics do not stop expecting to reap the 
benefits of the political system, and they are no less vigilant in seeking the fulfillment of their 
demands. But their expectations are no longer inscribed in the heroic framework of a totalizing 
politics. 
For that reason, we can see that suspicion is not the opposite of legitimacy, but a subtle means of 
managing legitimacy. A lack of interest can be a completely practical response (Luhmann 1993, 191). 
Some even believe that a certain amount of political apathy is a good sign. Democracies can withstand 
a high degree of disinterest; in fact, the sudden interest of people who are generally apathetic about 
politics tends to indicate that something is not working as it should. A certain amount of boredom is 
part and parcel of democratic normality, and excitement about politics does not always bode well. 
Much has been said about the way contemporary societies transfer sacredness from established 
religions to political projects. This picture could be completed by noting that, after the transfer of 
sacredness from religion to politics, we have reached an era where it is the nonconventional forms of 
politics, what we could call “alterpolitics,” that are consecrated. It is surprising to see this evolution of 
social expectations; we trust that alternative forms of politics will help us achieve that which we have 
stopped expecting from conventional politics, reactivating pure energies that, it seems, remained intact 
in the domain of depoliticized society. We could call this civil society, active citizenship, social 
movements, or “counterdemocracy,” to use the term coined by Pierre Rosanvallon (2008). 
In my opinion, those who expect the same things from nonpolitics as they previously expected 
from politics reveal that they have not grasped the transformations that have taken place in society. 
We live in a society that could be called post-heroic, where heroic appeals and the mindsets of 
resistance have lesser repercussions. If politics is no longer what it once was, neither is nonpolitics. 
Alternative political activities (participation, protests, social movements, etc.) no longer offer us the 
heroism that has faded from institutional politics. “Alterheroism” is a nostalgic refuge for those 
disappointed by politics in its current form, but like all forms of nostalgia, it is a remnant of the past. 
6. Paradoxes of Democratic Self-determination 
Democracy is a political system that intensifies our expectations; it makes us believe in things that are 
as inalienable and impossible as a free society that governs itself or in a society in which those who 
govern and are governed are identical. This ideal of self-determination is part of democracy’s useful 
fictional narrative, which does not mean that it is an ideal we should do without or that it reflects 
actual reality or that it is a literally demandable right. It is, like so many properties by which we define 
democracy, a goal, a critical or normative principle, in other words, like always, something more 
complex than what its mere formulation might suggest.  
Many of the debates that have been raised by the Indignados movement have revealed the 
paradoxes of popular sovereignty. It is a tension that has plagued theories of democracy from the very 
beginning. On the one hand, the ideal of a full democracy (often based on a model of direct 
democracy), the desire for participation, the insistence on the popular ratification of decisions and 
firmer mandates from voters, the demand that representatives reflect those who are represented as 
accurately as possible, a requirement that representatives fulfill their promises . . . . Compared with all 
these goals, voting seems quite insignificant.  
These aspirations are not new, and there are, in contrast, more realistic positions, like those put 
forth by Schumpeter (2003 [1942]) or Dahl (1971). While the details of their positions differ, both 
maintain that the greatest democracy to which we can aspire is a competitive oligarchy. At the same 
time, it is not easy to see how it can be a democracy when the bodies that participate in political 
Daniel Innerarity 
10 
decisions were either not elected or elected in very indirect ways (like judges, independent authorities, 
or certain international bodies). It would not be very realistic to demand that institutions and 
procedures of global governance uphold the same democratic standards that are required of nation 
states. On the other hand, experience teaches us that democracy is not always a product of democrats, 
but of Jacobins or rigid state machines that are defended by states of emergency and sustained by a 
public that hates political parties, especially those parties that are not particularly unified, in other 
words, parties that allow criticism and freedom of expression.  
We owe the most famous formulation of democratic sovereignty, of its particular squaring of the 
circle, to Rousseau. This is how he synthesizes it in his Social Contract: “‘The problem is to find a 
form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods 
of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and 
remain as free as before’” ( 2008 [1762], 23). This objective is contradictory, incompatible with our 
political condition, and particularly unattainable in complex societies. In that sense, it could recall 
Morgan’s observation (1988, 14) that government requires make-believe. (These fabrications support 
both the assumption that the king is divine as well as the idea that the people have one single voice and 
are represented by their representatives.)  
To understand the innocence of its first formulations, we must keep in mind that representative 
democracy arose at a time when the harmony of society’s interests and values was imaginable. 
Modern democracy was first conceived prior to today’s political pluralism or the great social conflicts 
of the contemporary era. Its original simplicity is also combined with a certain anthropological 
naïveté. Schumpeter called attention to this fact when he observed that eighteenth century 
philosophers saw the common good as an obvious beacon light, so clear that anyone could recognize 
it. Failure to do so could only be explained by ignorance, stupidity, or evil (2003, 250).  
That led to the anti-partyism of the founders of English and American democracy (Rosenblum 
2008) that then developed into the organic democracies of the twentieth century and into 
contemporary populisms (in a context in which there are, coincidentally, more and more parties that 
reject that designation). It was assumed that everyone would conveniently choose to live under the 
same laws, so the parties were understood as factions, artifices that broke with the natural unity of 
societies, spurious divisions, or the direct result of the ambitions of politicians. Even the very idea of 
opposition made no sense. If the people’s self-government is literal, if those who govern are the same 
as those who are governed, there is no right to opposition. It took some time in the history of 
democracy to establish the idea that the people can oppose a government that had achieved a majority 
of the votes.  
Today, in more complex societies, we affirm that the general will can only be the result of 
compromise among diverse groups. That is why Kelsen could affirm that the concept of public interest 
or organic solidarity that transcends the interests of group, class, or nationality is, in the last analysis, 
an anti-political illusion (1988, 33). How do we define the ideal of self-determination in large, 
complex societies with heterogeneous preferences when it seems inevitable that at least some of the 
people at certain periods of time will be subject to laws they do not like? 
The solution to this dilemma has been the idea of representation, the institutional concentration of 
an experience that our rhetoric tends to conceal: the fact that democracy is a representative system 
means that the citizens do not govern; we are inevitably governed by others. Elections are not held 
every day; mandates are vague; some of the things for which we vote are less important to us than 
others; as voters, we give elected officials some room to maneuver; the demand for unanimity (in 
which everyone’s desires would be realized) is impossible and blocks . . . . One of the greatest 
challenges of political theory is determining what conditions and what democratic justification allow 
this hetero-determination. 
In the first place, if the citizens do not govern in complex societies—they do not govern everything 
or continuously or every detail—it is because to a certain extent decisions are delegated: governments 
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should be capable of governing. If governments only did that which elections expressly authorized 
them to do, there would be many limitations when it came time to govern. Some of the limitations 
would be positive (because there would be less arbitrariness and fewer broken promises) and some 
negative (because new situations arise, because a majority government would have to be configured, 
or because it would require the creation of pacts). In any case, “mandates are not instructions” 
(Przeworski, Manin, and Stokes 1999, 12), but indications that should be concretized through 
compromises or guidelines for confronting the unpredictable future.  
Any leadership will have inevitable costs in terms of democratic authorization and the remoteness 
demanded by the adoption of decisions (especially the ones we often call “unpopular”). If a 
government does not maintain a certain distance from voters, he is sometimes unable to tell the truth. 
In addition, politics cannot separate itself from the current moment, which is one of the biggest 
burdens it suffers nowadays. We must either justify this “distance” democratically or we will be 
unable to muster the arguments to oppose the plebiscitary populism that enjoys strong defenders on 
both the right and the left.  
It is not a question of choosing between inefficiency and betrayal but of ensuring governments will 
not distance themselves too much from the mandates of the electors or let their rigidity make them 
inefficient. Citizens must tolerate a degree of permissiveness in government decisions because 
mandates in a democracy are not absolute imperatives. The inevitable need political parties have to 
negotiate reduces the power of the voters. When they need to form coalition governments, when new 
and unexpected factors arise that demand unprecedented decisions, political parties and the 
government find themselves obligated to distance themselves from express mandates or to make 
modifications that were not expressly authorized. In these situations, would we prefer to condemn 
them to inefficiency or to demand express authorization (by referendum or a new election), even 
though that is not always possible or desirable?  
The notion of self-government is not incoherent or impractical unless it is formulated in a weak 
manner: a democracy is not a regime in which every action is what we all want. It is a regime in which 
individual decisions have some influence on the final collective decision. Democracy is the system 
that best reflects individual preferences, nothing more and nothing less. The democratic objective is to 
allow as much self-government as possible, while knowing that it is inevitable that some people will 
live under laws that they do not like and that have been determined by other people. What should be 
done to make their “submission” legitimate and acceptable? The great invention of democracy is that 
governments are provisional; there is the possibility that the government will be replaced and other 
people will take over. 
So then, we allow other people to govern us because change is possible. This is the procedure that 
allows the realization of the ideal of self-government in complex societies. We are governed by other 
people, but we can be governed by different other people if that is what we want. “Democratic 
freedom consisted not in obeying only oneself but in obeying today someone in whose place one 
would be tomorrow” (Manin 1997, 28).  
The solution of alternation, the precedent of which is Aristotle’s formulation of governments ruling 
in turn, is realized, in modern democracies, through free elections. Elections are the fundamental 
instrument of self-government. With them, we attempt to elect those who will follow the people’s 
mandate. Of all the instruments of political participation, elections are the most egalitarian 
(Przeworski 2010). Even though electoral participation is not perfect, it is a more important political 
device than any of the other participatory procedures, which often privilege the people who have the 
most resources to participate.  
By virtue of elections, the people who are in power confront the possibility of losing it through 
established procedures, which means that elected officials are forced to anticipate this very threat. The 
possibility of electing and substituting those who govern us offers credibility to the fiction that we 
govern ourselves. Elections are precisely the moment of greatest uncertainty, when possibility hovers 
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over everyone like a promise or a threat. Elections are an interruption of inertia, an established break 
from continuity. It is a time when the fact that politics introduces us into a world in which one has to 
respond and account for one’s actions is made manifest. Power is not absolute because it must be 
defended, and the opportunities afforded by politics are only temporary. That is why no other moment 
concentrates as much fear and hope as elections because there is never as much at stake nor is reality 
so uncertain and so distinguishable from the merely possible. The democratic game, to which all 
participants implicitly submit, means that the person who won could have lost and may well lose in the 
future.  
Of course elections, while very important, should not be idealized as if democracy required nothing 
else. But the process of holding elections is the means by which the promise of democratic self-
determination is maintained and reiterated. In the end, it turns out that something this commonplace 
and ordinary, something that strikes us as rather insipid and that barely interests half the population is 
what best reflects the ideal of self-government and protects us from the appropriation of the us by any 
triumphant majority.  
Our political condition allows human beings to do a great number of things that would be 
impossible if we lived like Gods or beasts, as Aristotle suggested, but it also poses a good number of 
limitations. That being said, knowing and recognizing our limits has some unexpected benefits, such 
as preparing us to challenge illegitimate restrictions. Being conscious of our limits is essential in order 
to push those limits as far as possible. In this way, we will not criticize democracy for failing to 
provide things we should not expect of it, and we will be protected from demagogic appeals that 
promise that which cannot be guaranteed. We will know what we have the right to expect and what is, 
conversely, futile.  
Some will feel that this analysis is not hopeful enough or that it throws cold water on our best 
expectations about the quality of democracy. But one need not be a disheartened cynic to remember 
that a lack of hope is not always bad; we should be pleased if those who project only false illusions are 
dissatisfied and reassured if true zealots are discouraged. In general, democratic maturity involves a 
certain degree of disappointment, especially the disappointment that arises from the unmasking of 
exaggerated hope.  
Political experience includes some demystification of democracy, which does not prevent us from 
appreciating it or defending it or abandoning the attempt to improve it. In fact, it is just the opposite: if 
we are blind to possible reforms, it is most likely as a result of disproportionate expectations. We must 
distinguish the dissatisfactions that correspond to shortcomings that should be corrected and those that 
result from the limitations of the human condition and our way of organizing ourselves. Knowing 
when, where, and why there are no alternatives allows us to unmask the people who self-interestedly 
insist there are no alternatives when there can and should be.  
7. The Representability of Society 
There are protests that question certain decisions and others that criticize the partiality of 
representation, but contemporary protest movements such as the Indignados go one step further when 
they condemn the idea of representation in and of itself. Their underlying ideal is direct democracy 
without mediation. One of their slogans, “You don’t represent us,” is profoundly anti-political because 
there can be no politics without representation. These protests include many factors, many of them 
very admirable, but they tend to lack a political criticism of politics. Politicians are poor at doing 
certain things that no one does better than they do. We can replace them, and perhaps we should, but 
we should not let ourselves be deceived by the smokescreen that those who replace them are not, in 
turn, politicians.  
What is at stake in this debate is whether a democratic society can avoid the limitations of 
representation and do without its benefits. Representation is a site of compromise and mediation 
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where, for example, parity and territorial balance are assured; these factors are not self-regulated, but 
require explicit decisions. It is unrealistic to believe these complex balances can be left to the vagaries 
of spontaneity. The self-regulation of the marketplace that is supported by the right and the political 
self-regulation that is lauded by the left suggest very similar preconceptions that coincide in holding 
the artificial dimension of the public space in low regard.  
The will of the people is at least as fragile as the will of the individual; the whole process that leads 
to configuring the public space—balancing deliberation and decision, participation and delegation—is 
an arduous and complex process, threatened on the one hand by indecision and on the other by the 
thoughtlessness of its constituents. The problem of political representation is that it has to come up 
with a democratic synthesis from all interested parties. This synthesis must be singular, helpful in 
making decisions, and respectful of the plural nature of societies. Deciding without deliberation would 
be illegitimate; deliberating without deciding would be inefficient. A democracy is not a regime of 
referendums, but a system that articulates diverse criteria such as the participation of citizens, the 
quality of deliberations, the transparency of decisions, and the exercise of responsibilities.  
Politics always ends up having to confront the responsibility of creating a democratic synthesis, 
which may be very provisional and amendable, but it is still a synthesis. Without it, we would not even 
perceive the differences we want to protect. If the public space is important in a democratic sense, it is 
not only because everyone has the right to assert their desires or convictions, but because they must 
lay them on the line at the heart of a debate in which integrative public policies are determined.  
Representation once found its enemies in pre-democratic, absolutist states, but it is now placed in 
question by a libertarianism that speaks in the name of social networks, civil society, the self-
regulation of the markets, or direct democracy. These are different labels that all coincide in their 
suspicion toward mediation. From this perspective, rather than being a tool for configuring the public 
space, representation becomes the means of expressing desires, interests, and identities. This leads to 
viewing the “proximity” of representatives as an ideal. It is said that the more the representatives are 
like those represented, the better. But the current political crisis does not, as they tend to say, stem 
from the great distance that separates voters from elected officials, but from the complete opposite. 
We must confront the difficulty of democratically legitimizing the distance between representatives 
and their constituents so that the coherence and organization of society is made possible.  
Politics, conceived of in this way, is impossible, because politics means representation and 
synthesis. Individual private rights are foregrounded and understood as something entirely separate 
from the political arena, complete in their original form, free from any need for negotiation or 
compromise, radically depoliticized. Politics would then be an immediate transposition of whatever 
society happens to be, without being “worked on,” without the added value of cooperation, as if any 
intervention by other people were a betrayal of principles that are immediately obvious. Any political 
mediation would be synonymous with falsifying and concealment. The problem with all of this is that 
without representation, society would be shattered by a surfeit of demands that all insist on their 
mutual incompatibility.  
Representation is not a cacophonous transposition of social variability but a task of synthesizing, a 
process in which compromises are configured in such a way that societies can act like societies 
without abandoning their constituent plurality. The deliberative principle is opposed to this belief in a 
private, pre-political, and exogenous sphere, which ignores the degree to which preferences are a 
product of laws, preconceptions, and power dynamics. The conception of a social order that succumbs 
to the immediacy of interest groups seems not to recognize the transformative power of politics, which 
does not merely manage what exists but frequently modifies the point of departure. Among other 
things, politics allows society to acquire a certain distance from itself, a thoughtfulness that allows it to 
critically examine its own practices (Sunstein 2004). In the public sphere befitting a republic, the 
emphasis is not on the people’s pre-established interests or irremediably incompatible visions of the 
world. Instead, communicative processes that contribute to forming and transforming the opinions, 
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interests, and identities of the citizens are foregrounded. The goal of these processes is not to satisfy 
individual interests or to assure the coexistence of different conceptions of the world, but to 
collectively elaborate common interpretations of coexistence (Habermas 1996).  
We still need to make a lot of improvements to representative democracy, but there is as of yet no 
candidate to replace it. What I see, at the heart of the enthusiasm for alternative forms of social action, 
is an attempt to escape political logic, in other words, an attempt to escape plural action and 
compromise. This is the dream of a society in which the limitations of our political condition are 
permanently overcome. This dream of getting beyond politics is shared by many people whose 
company should strike us as suspect.  
Representation is an authorized relationship that sometimes disappoints and that, under certain 
conditions, can be revoked. But we can never dispense with representation without stripping the 
political community of coherence and the capacity for action. We can improve representation, we can 
demand better reporting, greater control, new representatives, as much transparency as we need, but 
we should not look for solutions elsewhere or, especially, in a non-political framework. That would 
mean giving ground to those who think that politics cannot work, who are unintentionally allied with 
those who do not want politics to work.  
8. Provisional Conclusion: Protests and Indignation are not enough 
In a society with low intensity citizenship, soaring estrangement from politics, flat debates, and non-
existent discussions, any appeal to jump on the criticism bandwagon receives immediate approval. If 
the person writing the statement is, additionally, a former French resistance fighter and one of the 
drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is impossible to contradict him or attempt to 
modify the specifics of his position without coming across as a stooge of the system.  
Nevertheless . . . . Indignation is a necessary, but insufficient, civic virtue. With apologies to 
Stéphane Hessel and his Indignez-Vous!, I see things differently, and I believe the fundamental 
problem lies elsewhere. In the first place, rather than a lack of indignation, we suffer the complete 
opposite. There is indignation everywhere; simply flipping through the channels affords a vision of 
people who are almost all indignant (particularly on the extremely conservative stations). We find 
indignation among those who believe the welfare state is being whittled away, for example, but also 
among those who believe it is going too far. The indignant label applies to those who believe there are 
too many foreigners, to zealots of all types, and to those who have allowed their fear to be agitated by 
the people who hope to channel it.  
Our societies are full of people who are “against” while there is a dearth of those who are “for” 
something concrete and identifiable. The problem is how to confront the fact that the negative energies 
of indignation, dramatisation, and victimization are what energize people. This is what Pierre 
Rosanvallon has called “the age of negative democracy,” where those who object do not choose to do 
so in the manner of previous rebels or dissidents, since their attitude does not specify any desirable 
horizon or plan of action. In this situation, the problem is how to distinguish regressive anger from 
justifiable indignation and how to make use of the latter in favor of movements with transformative 
capabilities.  
But what if the people who listen to these curses with pleasure are not the solution but part of the 
problem? Asking people to get indignant implies telling them they are right and that they should 
continue to respond as they have been doing until now, living a mixture of conformity and 
unproductive indignation. The revolutionary stance would be to effectively break with populism, with 
the immediacy and adulation that is the cause of our worst relapses. In addition, these populist appeals 
keep offering us simple explanations for complex problems. Indignation will stop being a harmless 
broadside that is incapable of improving the objectionable situations that provoke it when it provides 
some reasonable analysis about why that which is happening is happening, when it successfully 
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identifies problems instead of being satisfied with identifying guilty parties, when it proposes some 
form of action.  
And what if indignation is benefitting those who are satisfied with or even responsible for the state 
of affairs that makes us indignant? It may be that these bursts of protest are less transformative of 
reality than an on-going, sustained effort to formulate good analyses and make patient efforts at 
introducing improvements. One could discuss a conservative function of indignation in that it 
stabilizes systems just as letting one’s hair down or employing escape valves do. It may end up being 
the most practical approach to keeping things just the way they are. We need something more in order 
to move toward a better world, but that something is not greater dramatic exaggeration of our 
dissatisfaction; it is, in the first place, a good theory that helps us understand what is happening in the 
world without falling into the comfortable temptation of concealing its complexity. Only at that point 
can programs, projects, or leaderships be formulated that will afford a type of efficient, coherent, and 
capable social intervention capable of attracting a majority of the people, and not merely those who 
are angry.  
Now that there is a trend of authors exhorting others to do something political—to become 
indignant or to get engaged—I would propose, in spite of almost never knowing what other people 
should do, an alternative slogan: Comprehend! I am using “comprehension” in both its senses. On the 
one hand, recognize the complexity of the world and the restrictions our political realities impose on 
us and, on the other hand, be understanding about those difficulties. Any criticism that does not find a 
starting point in both these attitudes—respect for the challenges of politics and benevolence toward 
those who undertake it—will not be as profound as it could be in challenging the political system’s 
evident deficiencies with solid analysis.  
Bibliography 
Bardhan, Pranab. 1999. “Democracy and Development: A Complex Relationship.” In Democracy’s 
Value, edited by Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, 95-96. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Calhoun, Craig. 1988. “Populist Politics, Communications Media and Large Scale Societal 
Integration.” Sociological Theory 6.2, 219-41. 
Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. “Treatise on Nomadology.” In Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 2. A Thousand Plateaus. Translated by Brain Massumi. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 351-423. 
Dogan, Mattéi, ed. 2005. Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians. Boston: Brill. 
Flichy, Patrice. 2010. Sacre de l’amateur. Paris: Seuil. 
Grunberg, Gérard, and Zaki Laïdi. 2007. Sortir du pessimism social: Essai sur l’ identité de la gauche. 
Paris: Hachette. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp. 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. 
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. 
Kelsen, Hans. 1988. La Démocratie. Paris: Economica. 
Klein, Naomi. 2000. No Logo. London: Flamingo. 
Lipovetsky, Gilles. 2006. La société de déception. Paris: Textuel. 
Daniel Innerarity 
16 
Luhmann, Niklas. 1993. Legitimation durch Verfahren. Frankfurt: Luchterhand. 
Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Morgan, Edmund S. 1988. Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and 
America. New York: Norton. 
Przeworski, Adam. 2010. Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam, Bernard Manin, and Susan Stokes, eds. 1999. Democracy, Accountability and 
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rosenblum, Nancy L. 2008. On the Side of Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship. 
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press. 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 2008 (1762). The Social Contract. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. New York: 
Cosimo. 
Sartre, Jean Paul. 1992. Notebooks for an Ethics. Translated by David Pellauer. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 2003 (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Taylor and Francis e-
library. 
Sunstein, Cass R. 2004. “Más allá del resurgimiento republicano.” In Nuevas ideas republicanas. 
Autogobierno y libertad. Edited by F. Ovejero, J. L. Martí, and Roberto Gargarella. Barcelona: 
Paidós. 
Zizek, Slavoj. 2010. Living in the End of Times. London: Verso. 
Politics after Indignation: Possibilities and Limits of Direct Democracy 
17 
Author contacts: 
 
Daniel Innerarity 
The Institute for Democratic Governance, GLOBERNANCE  
Palacio de Aiete, Paseo de Aiete 65 
20009 Donostia – San Sebastián. Spain 
Email: daniel innerarity <dinner@unizar.es> 
 
  
 
